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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In 1996, the 104th Congress passed, and the President 
signed into law, two bills that made sweeping changes in 
the immigration laws: the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214 (1996), and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRIRA"), Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). This case concerns the 
effect of these statutes on the jurisdiction of a district court 
to issue a writ of habeas corpus sought by an alien because 
of a decision by the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
("INS") to deport the alien by reason of his having 
committed a criminal act listed in IIRIRA. 
 
In the case before us, the District Court granted in part 
Reynaldo Sandoval's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
The Attorney General, the INS, the INS Commissioner, and 
the Acting Regional Director of the INS (collectively "the 
government") appeal from the District Court's exercise of 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2241 and from its 
subsequent decision on the merits. Sandoval's brief as 
appellee is supported by an amicus brief filed by a group of 
twenty-three law professors urging affirmance of the 
District Court. 
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The jurisdictional question is whether, in enacting 
AEDPA and IIRIRA, Congress stripped the district courts of 
habeas jurisdiction over deportation proceedings, an 
inquiry that could implicate the Suspension Clause of the 
Constitution. If the District Court had jurisdiction, we will 
have to decide a question of statutory interpretation: 
whether AEDPA S 440(d), a statutory change that occurred 
while Sandoval's case was pending and that makes aliens 
who have been found guilty of drug offenses ineligible for 
discretionary relief under S 212(c) of the Immigration and 
Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. S 1182 (Supp. 1996) 
(repealed effective April 1, 1997), applies to Sandoval. Only 
if AEDPA S 440(d) does apply to Sandoval would we need to 
reach his argument that the provision violates equal 
protection by precluding deportable aliens who have been 
convicted of certain crimes from obtaining S 212(c) relief but 
not precluding excludable aliens who are otherwise 
identically situated from obtaining that relief, an issue not 
reached by the District Court. 
 
II. 
 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 
Sandoval, a citizen of Mexico, entered the United States 
without inspection in 1986. In 1987, he was granted 
temporary resident status as a Special Agricultural Worker 
under the amnesty program set up by the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act of 1986 S 302, 8 U.S.C.S 1160. 
Pursuant to the amnesty program, he was granted Lawful 
Permanent Resident status in 1990. Accordingly, Sandoval 
was entitled to remain in the country, and eventually 
qualify for citizenship, provided that he did not commit an 
act subjecting him to deportation. In 1993, Sandoval was 
convicted in a state court of marijuana possession, which 
conviction subjected him to deportation under INA 
S 241(a)(2)(B)(I), 8 U.S.C. S 1251(a)(2)(B)(1) (current version 
at 8 U.S.C. S 1227(a)(2)(B)(I)). 
 
The deportation hearing was held on June 14, 1994. 
Sandoval requested a four-month stay, apparently because 
at the end of that four months he would have completed 
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seven years as a legal immigrant, a prerequisite for 
eligibility for discretionary relief under INA S 212(c). Section 
212(c), as it stood at the time, granted the Attorney General 
discretion to admit an otherwise deportable alien if the 
alien had established lawful domicile for seven or more 
years; the provision barred such relief where the alien had 
committed two or more crimes of moral turpitude, but did 
not then foreclose discretionary relief in cases where the 
alien was deportable solely for having committed a drug 
offense. The Immigration Judge ("IJ") denied the stay and 
ruled that (1) Sandoval was deportable, and (2) he had not 
met the seven-year lawful domicile requirement for 
eligibility for discretionary relief. Sandoval then appealed 
this decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). 
 
While Sandoval's appeal was pending, Congress passed 
AEDPA. Section 440(d) of that Act amended INA S 212(c) so 
as to make discretionary relief unavailable to those aliens 
who have been convicted of, inter alia, any of the drug 
offenses set forth in INA S 241(a)(2)(B)(I). On July 16, 1997, 
the BIA dismissed Sandoval's appeal, noting that AEDPA's 
amendment of S 212(c) rendered Sandoval "statutorily 
ineligible for section 212(c) relief." In doing so, the BIA cited 
the Attorney General's ruling that AEDPA's revision of 
S 212(c) applies to pending cases. See Matter of Soriano, 
Interim Decision 3289 (A.G. Feb. 21, 1997). The BIA's 
decision rendered Sandoval's deportation order 
administratively final on July 16, 1997. Because Sandoval 
had attained seven years of domicile before his deportation 
order became final, the statutory residency requirement has 
been met and is no longer an issue in this case. See 8 
C.F.R. S 3.2(c)(1). Consequently, the amendment to S 212(c) 
effected by AEDPA is the only ground for statutory 
ineligibility advanced by the government. 
 
In October, Sandoval filed a motion with the BIA, 
requesting that the INS reopen his case. He also requested 
a stay of deportation from the District Director, which was 
denied. On December 1, 1997, Sandoval filed a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. His petition argued 
that AEDPA's change to S 212(c) does not apply to cases 
pending on the date of enactment (and therefore that the 
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Soriano decision was incorrect). He also argued that AEDPA 
S 440(d) violates equal protection. The government moved to 
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
The District Court ruled that it had habeas jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. S 2241, reasoning that the relevant 
provisions of AEDPA and IIRIRA did not effect a repeal of 
S 2241 in deportation cases. The court proceeded to rule on 
the merits of the petition and held that AEDPA S 440(d) 
does not apply to cases that were pending when the statute 
was enacted. Employing the principles set forth in Landgraf 
v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994), and elaborated in 
Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997), the District Court 
held that Congress expressed its intent not to apply 
S 440(d) to pending cases. In so doing, the court did not 
reach any constitutional issue relating to habeas 
jurisdiction or the equal protection challenge to AEDPA 
S 440(d). Consequently, the District Court granted 
Sandoval's petition in part, ordered the INS to entertain the 
merits of his S 212(c) request and enjoined the government 
from deporting Sandoval pending a decision on the merits 
of his S 212(c) request. 
 
The government appeals this decision. While this appeal 
was pending, the BIA denied Sandoval's motion to reopen, 
and Sandoval then filed a Petition for Review with this 
court. On August 19, 1998, we consolidated the 
government's appeal with Sandoval's Petition for Review. 
 
III. 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
A. 
 
Jurisdiction 
 
1. The Applicable Statutory Changes 
 
On April 24, 1996 the President signed AEDPA into law, 
and on September 30, 1996 IIRIRA was enacted. These two 
statutes altered many of the substantive provisions of the 
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Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and also made 
significant changes in INA's provisions relating to judicial 
review. Prior to the enactment of AEDPA, judicial review of 
deportation orders ordinarily proceeded by a Petition for 
Review of the INA decision filed in the court of appeals. See 
Majority op. at 16 infra. At the same time, INA S 106(a)(10) 
provided for review of a deportation order by habeas corpus 
proceeding. AEDPA S 401(e) deleted the former text of INA 
S 106(a)(10). AEDPA S 440(a) substituted therefor the 
following language: "Any final order of deportation against 
an alien who is deportable by reason of having committed 
a criminal offense [covered in the deportation provisions of 
the INA] shall not be subject to review by any court."1 
 
The judicial review structure for deportation orders was 
altered several months later with the passage of IIRIRA on 
September 30, 1996. IIRIRA contains two different sets of 
rules: the "permanent rules" which generally became 
effective on April 1, 1997, see IIRIRA S 309(a), and the 
"transitional changes in judicial review" ("transitional 
rules"), which generally became effective on October 30, 
1996 and which apply to aliens who were placed in removal 
proceedings before April 1, 1997.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. AEDPA S 440(a), which was codified at 8 U.S.C. S 1105a(a)(10), states 
in part: 
 
       Judicial Review.--Section 106 of the Immigration and Nationality 
       Act . . . is amended to read as follows: 
 
       (10) Any final order of deportation against an alien who is 
       deportable by reason of having committed a criminal offense 
       covered in section 241(a)(2) (A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) or any 
offense 
       covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate 
offenses 
       are covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(I), shall not be subject to 
review 
       by any court. 
 
Section 1105a was repealed by IIRIRA S 306(b) with respect to 
deportation proceedings that were initiated on or after April 1, 1997. See 
IIRIRA SS 306(b), (c), 309. For such proceedings, IIRIRA substitutes new 
judicial review provisions. See IIRIRA S 306(a). Because Sandoval's 
deportation proceedings commenced before April 1, 1997, the repealer 
and the new judicial review rules do not apply to his case. 
 
2. Both sets of rules were clarified by technical amendments enacted on 
October 11, 1997, Pub. L. 104-302, 110 Stat. 3656, 3657. 
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One of the transitional rules, IIRIRA S 309(c)(4)(G), 
provides, in relevant part: 
 
       [T]here shall be no appeal permitted in the case of an 
       alien who is inadmissible or deportable by reason of 
       having committed a criminal offense covered in section 
       212(a)(2) or section 241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D) of the 
       Immigration and Nationality Act (as in effect as of the 
       date of the enactment of this Act), or any offense 
       covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) of such Act (as in 
       effect on such date) for which both predicate offenses 
       are, without regard to their date of commission, 
       otherwise covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(I) of such Act 
       (as so in effect).3 
 
Because Sandoval's deportation proceedings were initiated 
before April 1, 1997 and his appeal was dismissed by the 
BIA after October 30, 1996, that rule is applicable here. 
 
Finally, IIRIRA S 306(a) amends INA S 242(g), 8 U.S.C. 
S 1252(g), to provide: "Except as provided in this section 
and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court 
shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on 
behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by 
the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate 
cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under 
this Act."4 
 
The District Court rejected the government's position that 
this provision applies to Sandoval, basing its decision on 
the general effective date provided by IIRIRA S 309(c)(1). 
However, section 306(c)(1) states that "the amendments 
made by subsections (a) and (b) [which contain the 
permanent rules for judicial review] shall apply as provided 
under section 309, except that subsection (g) of section 242 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. By congressional directive, the transitional rules are not part of the 
INA and are not codified in the United States Code. 
 
4. IIRIRA dispenses with the terms "deportation" and "exclusion," groups 
these categories under the rubric of "removal," and provides for the 
uniform administration of removal proceedings. This opinion preserves 
the distinction between "deportation" and"exclusion" because under 
AEDPA--which governs this case by virtue of the transitional rules--that 
distinction continues to have meaning. 
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of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as added by 
subsection (a)), shall apply without limitation to claims 
arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, 
deportation, or removal proceedings under such Act" 
(emphasis added). In light of this provision, we conclude 
that the government is correct in arguing that the amended 
INA S 242(g) applies to this case. 
 
2. Recent Cases Construing the 1996 Amendments 
 
The government argues that as a consequence of these 
three amendments effected by AEDPA and IIRIRA, the 
District Court had no habeas jurisdiction to review 
Sandoval's challenges to his final order of deportation. In 
the period following the filing of this appeal, the same 
question has been decided by five other circuits. Three of 
the decisions rejected the government's position; two have 
adopted the government's arguments. 
 
In Goncalves v. Reno, 144 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 1998), the 
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed the district 
court's dismissal of an alien's habeas petition, holding that 
Congress did not eliminate habeas jurisdiction under 
S 2241. 
 
Shortly thereafter, in Henderson v. Reno, 157 F.3d 106 
(2d Cir. 1998), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
affirmed the decisions of two district courts that they had 
jurisdiction under S 2241 to grant writs of habeas corpus to 
aliens who were deportable because they had committed 
listed crimes. The Second Circuit relied on its earlier 
decision in Jean-Baptiste v. Reno, 144 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 
1998), where it affirmed the dismissal of an alien's Petition 
for Review. In Jean-Baptiste, the court held that the 
foreclosure of judicial review did not offend the Constitution 
because habeas review under S 2241 remained intact. 
 
Similarly, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held 
in Magana-Pizano v. INS, 152 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1998) (per 
curiam), that the district court retained habeas jurisdiction 
under S 2241 to hear the claim of an alien who had 
committed a drug offense. It reasoned that if IIRIRA were 
read to eliminate all judicial review of executive detention, 
it would violate the Suspension Clause. That circuit had 
previously held, in Hose v. INS, 141 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 
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1998), that IIRIRA withdrew the jurisdiction of the district 
court to hear a habeas petition by an alien who sought to 
appeal an immigration judge's determination that she was 
excludable. The court noted that the Suspension Clause 
was not violated because Hose, who had not been convicted 
of a listed crime, could have filed a Petition for Review in 
the court of appeals, an option not available to Magana- 
Pizano. On December 2, 1998, the Ninth Circuit granted 
rehearing en banc and withdrew the Hose  opinion. See 
Hose v. INS, 161 F.3d 1225 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 
Although the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia has not yet reached the question, a district court 
in that circuit held that neither AEDPA nor IIRIRA deprived 
it of its jurisdiction under the general habeas provision of 
28 U.S.C. S 2241 to hear a similar claim by an alien. Lee v. 
Reno, 15 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 1998). 
 
In recent months, two Courts of Appeals have taken a 
contrary position to that taken by the other three Courts of 
Appeals. In Richardson v. Reno, 1998 WL 850045 (11th Cir. 
Dec. 9, 1998), opinion vacated and superseded, 1998 WL 
889376 (11th Cir. Dec. 22, 1998), the Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit concluded that IIRIRA's amendment to 
INA S 242(g) did eliminate habeas jurisdiction under S 2241. 
The court further held that this elimination of jurisdiction 
suffered from no constitutional infirmity. Although the 
petitioner in Richardson was an alien who was detained 
upon re-entry into the United States, and therefore the case 
arose in a slightly different procedural posture, the case 
otherwise involves the same statutory provisions and 
applicable legal principles. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit quickly 
followed Richardson in LaGuerre v. Reno , 1998 WL 912107 
(7th Cir. December 22, 1998), with a similar holding. It 
agreed with the conclusion that AEDPA S 440(a) deprives 
the district courts of habeas jurisdiction with respect to the 
executive's detention of aliens who have been convicted of 
the enumerated crimes. The court proceeded to read the 
statute as permitting such aliens to bring constitutional 
challenges to their detention in the courts of appeals by 
means of a petition for review, notwithstanding the general 
bar to petitions for review in AEDPA. The court adopted this 
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construction of the statute on the basis of a "presumption 
that executive resolutions of constitutional issues are 
judicially reviewable." Id. at *4. 
 
For the reasons set forth hereafter, we conclude that the 
district courts continue to have habeas jurisdiction under 
S 2241. Our colleague who dissents on this portion of our 
holding does so on the basis of the reasoning in LaGuerre. 
The resulting division among the courts on this important 
issue leaves the definitive interpretation for resolution by 
the Supreme Court. 
 
In addition to those courts who have directly ruled on the 
issue, others have addressed the jurisdictional issue 
tangentially in another context. All of the Courts of Appeals 
who have decided that because of AEDPA and IIRIRA, they 
no longer had jurisdiction to entertain a Petition for Review 
from an alien who has been deported for any of the criminal 
activity referenced in INA S 241(a)(2)(C), have stated that 
some degree of judicial review under habeas corpus 
remains available, although they did not specify the scope 
of that review. See, e.g., Lerma de Garcia v. INS, 141 F.3d 
215, 217 (5th Cir. 1998); Mansour v. INS, 123 F.3d 423, 
426 (6th Cir. 1997); Ramallo v. Reno, 114 F.3d 1210, 1214 
(D.C. Cir. 1997); Fernandez v. INS, 113 F.3d 1151, 1154 
n.3 (10th Cir. 1997). 
 
In this court's opinion in Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248 (3d 
Cir. 1998), we agreed with the other circuits on this issue. 
We too held that AEDPA S 440(a) deprived us of jurisdiction 
to entertain claims of legal error in a Petition for Review 
brought by an alien who was convicted of one of the crimes 
referenced in INA that disqualify an alien for S 212(c) 
discretionary relief. We were not faced with the issue of 
habeas jurisdiction in Morel and therefore did not address 
it, but in concluding that the elimination of our review 
jurisdiction was constitutional, we relied on the 
government's concession that some form of review for 
constitutional questions survived the enactment of AEDPA. 
Id. at 251. 
 
3. Availability of Habeas Jurisdiction 
 
We now address the issue we never reached in Morel: 
whether habeas jurisdiction remains available in the 
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district courts to review claims by aliens who have been 
ordered deported based on their criminal acts, 
notwithstanding the AEDPA and IIRIRA amendments relied 
on by the government. This question implicates the long- 
standing doctrine disfavoring repeal of jurisdictional 
statutes by implication. 
 
The Supreme Court had occasion to apply this doctrine 
recently in Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996). Felker 
involved AEDPA S 106(b), which bars state inmates from 
filing "second or successive" habeas corpus petitions 
without first obtaining permission from a three-judge panel 
of the relevant court of appeals. The statute provides that 
a panel's grant or denial of authorization to file"shall not 
be appealable and shall not be the subject of a petition for 
. . . writ of certiorari." AEDPA S 106(b)(3)(E), codified at 28 
U.S.C. S 2241(b)(3)(E). Noting that "[n]o provision of Title I 
mentions our authority to entertain original habeas 
petitions," the Court held that because repeals by 
implication are not favored, AEDPA's prohibition on 
certiorari jurisdiction over court of appeals panel decisions 
on second or successive petitions did not preclude the 
Supreme Court from exercising its original habeas 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. SS 2241 and 2254. 518 U.S. at 
660. 
 
The Felker Court took guidance from Ex Parte Yerger, 75 
U.S. 85 (1869), in which the Court, when faced with a 
similar repeal of its appellate jurisdiction well over a 
century ago, found that its habeas jurisdiction was intact. 
But to appreciate the significance of Yerger  fully, we must 
go back to Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). 
McCardle, like Yerger, involved an 1867 statute that 
authorized the federal courts to entertain habeas petitions 
by state or federal prisoners and also authorized the 
Supreme Court to hear appeals from the federal courts in 
habeas cases. McCardle, who was in federal custody, 
sought habeas relief. While the case was pending before the 
Supreme Court in 1868, Congress enacted, over President 
Andrew Johnson's veto, a bill repealing the portion of the 
1867 statute that conferred appellate jurisdiction on the 
Supreme Court over habeas proceedings. The McCardle 
court held that it had no jurisdiction because the 1867 
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conferral of appellate review power had been repealed by 
the 1868 enactment. 
 
The McCardle court, however, was not confronted with a 
statute that foreclosed all review. The Court specifically 
noted that the full extent of its jurisdiction, as it stood 
before the 1867 statute, remained: "Counsel seem to have 
supposed, if effect be given to the repealing act in question, 
that the whole appellate power of the court, in cases of 
habeas corpus, is denied. But this is an error. . . . . [The 
1868 repealer] does not affect the jurisdiction which was 
previously exercised." 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 515. 
 
The Yerger decision, issued one year after McCardle, dealt 
with the same statute on similar facts, but in Yerger the 
Court addressed its power under the general grant of 
habeas jurisdiction in the 1789 Judiciary Act. Finding that 
the 1868 enactment did not repeal its review power under 
the prior general grant of jurisdiction, the Court stated: 
 
       [T]here are no repealing words in the Act of 1867. If it 
       repealed the Act of 1789, it did so by implication .. . . 
 
        Repeals by implication are not favored. They are 
       seldom admitted except on the ground of repugnancy; 
       and never, we think, when the former Act can stand 
       together with the new Act. 
 
Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) at 105. 
 
Read together, McCardle, Yerger, and Felker establish the 
propositions that courts should not lightly presume that a 
congressional enactment containing general language 
effects a repeal of a jurisdictional statute, and, 
consequently, that only a plain statement of congressional 
intent to remove a particular statutory grant of jurisdiction 
will suffice. Informed by this precedent, we examine each of 
the 1996 statutory provisions that the government 
contends individually, or in totality, foreclose the District 
Court's habeas jurisdiction over Sandoval's deportation 
order. 
 
a. AEDPA S 401(e) 
 
AEDPA S 401(e), a non-codified provision, struck the text 
of former INA S 106(a)(10), a provision added by the 
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Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961, Pub. L. 87-301, 
S 5(a), 75 Stat. 651, and in its place inserted the language 
set forth in AEDPA S 440(a). Section 106(a)(10) had 
provided that "any alien held in custody pursuant to an 
order of deportation may obtain judicial review thereof by 
habeas corpus proceedings." The substituted language of 
AEDPA S 440(a) reads:  "[a]ny final order of deportation 
against an alien who is deportable by reason of having 
committed a criminal offense covered in [the deportation 
provisions of the INA] shall not be subject to review by any 
court." The government urges that the 1961 Act 
significantly curtailed habeas jurisdiction in immigration 
matters, and that AEDPA S 401(e) eliminated such vestigial 
habeas jurisdiction as existed after the 1961 Act. We are 
not persuaded by either proposition. 
 
In order to analyze this issue, we begin by reviewing 
some of the history of habeas corpus relief and judicial 
review in immigration cases. Although the specific reference 
to habeas jurisdiction in INA S 106(a)(10) was enacted as 
part of the 1961 Act, habeas jurisdiction over the 
Executive's detention of aliens has a considerably longer 
lineage. This jurisdiction was expressly recognized by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Jung Ah Lung , 124 U.S. 
621 (1888). A Chinese laborer, who had lost his certificate 
entitling him to reenter the United States and was being 
held in executive detention upon his return, successfully 
turned to the district court for a writ of habeas corpus. The 
government argued that under the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 
passed in the late nineteenth century, aliens excluded 
under the statute were not being deprived of liberty within 
the contemplation of the habeas statute. Id. at 626. The 
Court rejected this argument and also turned aside the 
government's argument that the federal courts' general 
statutory habeas power "was taken away by the Chinese 
Restriction Act, which regulated the entire subject matter, 
and was necessarily exclusive." Id. The Court stated that 
"[w]e see nothing in these Acts which in any manner affects 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States to issue 
a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 627-28. 
 
Subsequently, Congress, as part of the Immigration Act 
of 1891, sought to ensure the finality of executive branch 
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decisions regarding the exclusion of aliens by providing: "All 
decisions made by the inspection officers . . . touching the 
right of any alien to land, when adverse to such right, shall 
be final unless [appealed to the relevant executive officers]." 
Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 551, S 8, 26 Stat. 1084, 1085. In 
1894, this provision was made applicable in Chinese 
Exclusion Act proceedings. Act of Aug. 18, 1894, ch. 301, 
28 Stat. 372, 390. These finality provisions were apparently 
prompted by congressional dissatisfaction with judicial 
intervention in this area. See Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas 
Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 
Colum. L. Rev. 961, 1008 (1998). 
 
When the Supreme Court addressed the 1891 statute in 
Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892), it 
reaffirmed the availability of habeas to challenge 
immigration decisions notwithstanding the finality 
provision. The Court stated: "An alien immigrant, prevented 
from landing by any such officer claiming authority to do so 
under an act of Congress, and thereby restrained of his 
liberty, is doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to 
ascertain whether the restraint is lawful." Id. at 660. Hence, 
an alien's right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus to 
challenge the legal basis of his or her detention by the 
Executive Branch was firmly established in precedent more 
than a century ago. 
 
The Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, S 19, 39 Stat. 874, 
890 (repealed 1952), carried forward the provisions of the 
1891 and 1894 Acts that made the decisions of the 
Attorney General on deportation "final." When the 
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), ch. 24, 60 Stat. 237 
(codified at 5 U.S.C. S 500 et seq.), was enacted in 1946, it 
was unclear whether the "judicial review" of agency action 
that it provided extended to immigration cases. The Court 
answered that question in the negative in Heikkila v. 
Barber, 345 U.S. 229 (1953), concluding that the 
Immigration Act was "a statute precluding judicial review" 
within the meaning of the APA. Id. at 235. In so holding, 
the Court reviewed the period from 1891 (the year in which 
Congress passed the first in a series of statutes conferring 
finality on the Executive's immigration decisions) until 1952 
(the year that Congress authorized APA review of 
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immigration decisions), and stated that the legislative 
regime in force during that period "clearly had the effect of 
precluding judicial intervention in deportation cases except 
insofar as it was required by the Constitution." Id. at 234- 
35. Significantly, the Court expressly concluded that 
habeas jurisdiction persisted even during this period, 
stating that in light of its decision that the APA did not 
enlarge the alien's rights, "he may attack a deportation 
order only by habeas corpus." Id. at 235. 
 
Heikkila was decided under the Immigration Act of 1917, 
which was superseded by the Immigration and Nationality 
Act of 1952. The Supreme Court considered whether the 
APA applied to immigration cases under the 1952 Act in 
Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48 (1955). In particular, 
the Court focused on S 12 of the APA, which provided: "No 
subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify 
the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such 
legislation shall do so expressly." 60 Stat. at 244 (codified 
as amended at 5 U.S.C. S 559). Noting that"[i]n the 
subsequent 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act there is 
no language which `expressly' supersedes or modifies the 
expanded right of review granted by S 10 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act," id. at 51, the Court held in 
Shaughnessy (1) that the APA applied to immigration cases 
and (2) that under the APA's "generous review provisions," 
id., the district court could review a deportation challenge 
under the Declaratory Judgment Act. The Court so held 
notwithstanding that the 1952 Act had carried over the 
provision of the 1917 Act that provided that the Attorney 
General's deportation and exclusion decisions shall be final. 
Hence, as a result of the Shaughnessy decision, aliens were 
free to seek APA judicial review both in the courts of 
appeals and in the district courts. 
 
It is against this backdrop that Congress passed the 
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1961. Act of Sept. 26, 
1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, S 5, 75 Stat. 651. In that Act, 
Congress restructured judicial review, giving the courts of 
appeals "sole and exclusive" power to review deportation 
orders. The government relies on this language in 
contending that the 1961 Act curtailed habeas jurisdiction 
in immigration cases. However, the historical sequence 
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outlined above shows that this "sole and exclusive" 
language was addressed to the review provided under the 
APA, not to habeas jurisdiction. By locating APA review 
power in the courts of appeals, Congress sought to 
eliminate APA review by means of declaratory judgment 
actions in the district courts, a form of review that 
Shaughnessy had permitted. The "sole and exclusive" 
provision was not, as the government suggests, an effort to 
make APA review in the circuits work to the exclusion of 
habeas actions. See Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 231 (1963) 
("[O]ur decision in this case [that the court of appeals has 
initial, exclusive jurisdiction to review denial of suspension 
of deportation] in no way impairs the preservation and 
availability of habeas corpus relief."). 
 
That habeas jurisdiction was left intact by the 1961 Act 
is evidenced by the inclusion of S 106(a)(10), a new 
provision specifically providing that habeas jurisdiction was 
available for deportees. The legislative history makes clear 
that this provision was added out of concern that the "sole 
and exclusive" language might be read to deprive the courts 
of habeas jurisdiction, thereby creating a constitutional 
problem. The House Report states: 
 
       The section clearly specifies that the right to habeas 
       corpus is preserved to an alien in custody under a 
       deportation order. In that fashion, it excepts habeas 
       corpus from the language which elsewhere declares 
       that the procedure prescribed for judicial review in 
       circuit courts shall be exclusive. The section in no way 
       disturbs the Habeas Corpus Act in respect to the 
       courts which may issue writs of habeas corpus: aliens 
       are not limited to courts of appeals in seeking habeas 
       corpus. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 87-1086 at 29 (1961), reprinted in  1961 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2973. 
 
Consequently, S 106(a)(10) as it existed under the 1961 
Act cannot be said to have conferred habeas jurisdiction on 
the district courts. Such jurisdiction, recognized since the 
late nineteenth century, existed independently of the 1961 
Act. This inclusion of a reference to habeas relief is best 
understood as congressional acknowledgment that the 
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district courts continued to have habeas jurisdiction even 
though APA review was channeled to the courts of appeals. 
The foregoing effectively refutes the government's 
contention that AEDPA's S 401(e) repeal of INAS 106(a)(10) 
eliminated the district courts' jurisdiction to review 
deportation orders in habeas corpus proceedings. And since 
AEDPA S 401(e) does not manifest an intent to repeal the 
original grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction, currently 
embodied in 28 U.S.C. S 2241, the elimination of INA's 
reference to habeas jurisdiction does not overcome the 
presumption against finding a repeal of habeas corpus by 
implication. Accord Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 121 ("It does not 
follow from the repeal of [INA S 106(a)(10)] that S 2241 
habeas jurisdiction has been repealed altogether in 
immigration cases. Had Congress wished to eliminate any 
possible habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2241, it 
could have easily inserted an explicit reference, but it did 
not."); Lee, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 39 (" `[T]he bark of [AEDPA 
S 401(e)] is worse than its bite. . . .[T]he section only 
eliminates the INA habeas provision without mention of 
S 2241.' "). 
 
Our dissenting colleague places great importance on the 
fact that AEDPA S 401(e) was titled "Elimination of Custody 
Review by Habeas Corpus." However, as the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly noted, a title alone is not controlling. See 
Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections v. Yeskey, 118 S.Ct. 
1952, 1956 (1998) (" `[T]he title of a statute . . . cannot limit 
the plain meaning of the text. For interpretive purposes, [it 
is] of use only when [it] shed[s] light on some ambiguous 
word or phrase.' " (quoting Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio 
R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 528-29 (1947)). There is no text in 
the AEDPA amendments referring to habeas corpus review. 
 
b. AEDPA S 440(a) and IIRIRA S 309(c)(4)(G) 
 
The government also relies for its jurisdictional challenge 
on Congress's declarations in AEDPA S 440(a) that 
deportation orders relating to aliens found to have 
committed the specified offenses "shall not be subject to 
review by any court," and in IIRIRA S 309(c)(4)(G), a 
transitional rule, that "there shall be no appeal permitted" 
in the case of an alien who is inadmissible or deportable by 
reason of having committed a criminal offense [covered in 
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the deportation provisions of the INA]." These statements, it 
contends, are express indications that Congress sought to 
preclude habeas jurisdiction. We disagree. Neither of these 
provisions specifically mentions jurisdiction under S 2241. 
Hence, under Felker and Yerger, we do not find a 
sufficiently clear statement of congressional intent to repeal 
the general grant of habeas jurisdiction. 
 
This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that here, as was 
the case in Yerger, "the former Act can stand together with 
the new Act." 75 U.S. at 105. When viewed in light of the 
history of the Court's treatment of habeas jurisdiction in 
deportation cases, the references to "review" in the AEDPA 
provision and to "appeal" in the IIRIRA provision are 
properly understood as relating to judicial review under the 
APA. This is so because in the immigration context, the 
Court has historically drawn a sharp distinction between 
"judicial review"--meaning APA review--and the courts' 
power to entertain petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 
 
As noted above, the Supreme Court in Heikkila  held that 
although the 1917 Immigration Act was a "statute 
precluding judicial review" within the contemplation of the 
APA, an alien could challenge his or her executive detention 
via habeas. 345 U.S. at 235. In doing so, the Court was 
clear that the "judicial review" precluded by the 1917 Acts 
did not include habeas corpus; the Court expressly rejected 
the conclusions of three courts of appeals that had"taken 
the position that habeas corpus itself represented judicial 
review." Id. at 235-36. 
 
We can presume that Congress, in enacting AEDPA and 
IIRIRA, was cognizant of the Court's differentiation between 
"judicial review" on the one hand and writs of habeas 
corpus on the other. "It is always appropriate to assume 
that our elected representatives, like other citizens, know 
the law. . . . . [I]t is not only appropriate but also realistic 
to presume that Congress was thoroughly familiar with 
these unusually important precedents from this and other 
federal courts and that it expected its enactment to be 
interpreted in conformity with them." Cannon v. University 
of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 696-97, 699 (1979). Hence 
AEDPA S 440(a) and IIRIRA S 309(c)(4)(G) are most 
reasonably understood as foreclosing judicial review under 
 
                                19 
  
the APA, and not as relating to habeas jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. S 2241. 
 
c. IIRIRA S 306(a)'s amendment of INAS 242(g) 
 
The government also urges that INA S 242(g), as amended 
by IIRIRA S 306(a), precludes the federal courts from 
hearing claims arising from removal proceedings unless 
they are brought in a petition for review. It argues that 
S 242(g) is an expression of congressional intent to channel 
all deportation review into the courts of appeals. Section 
242(g) states: 
 
       Exclusive Jurisdiction. Except as provided in this 
       section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
       no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or 
       claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the 
       decision or action by the Attorney General to 
       commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 
       removal orders against any alien under this Chapter. 
 
The principles enunciated in Felker and Yerger apply with 
equal force with respect to this provision. As there is no 
express reference to jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.S 2241 in 
this provision, the rule disfavoring implied repeals requires 
us to conclude that jurisdiction under S 2241 is preserved 
under the amended INA S 242(g). Accord Goncalves, 144 
F.3d at 122; Lee, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 39 ("[T]he 
`notwithstanding' provision [of the new S 242(g)] is simply 
insufficient in light of Felker for the Court to imply a repeal 
of S 2241."). 
 
We are unpersuaded by the government's argument that 
the rule disfavoring repeals by implication does not apply 
here because the new INA S 242(g) sets up a comprehensive 
jurisdictional scheme which displaces, by virtue of its 
comprehensiveness, any other jurisdictional grant. In 
advancing this contention, the government cites as support 
the Supreme Court's decision in Argentine Republic v. 
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). That 
case concerned an action filed by Amerada Hess against 
Argentina in federal court alleging that Argentina was 
responsible in tort for bombing Amerada Hess's ship 
without justification during the conflict over the Falkland 
Islands. Jurisdiction was predicated on the Alien Tort 
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Statute, 28 U.S.C. S 1350. Argentina moved to dismiss on 
the basis of immunity granted to foreign sovereigns under 
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), Pub. 
L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified in scattered sections 
of 28 U.S.C.). 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that 
because the FSIA had not repealed the earlier Alien Tort 
Statute, the prior statute continued to provide a basis for 
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that 
the principle disfavoring repeals by implication had no 
applicability to the FSIA, as "Congress' decision to deal 
comprehensively with the subject of foreign sovereign 
immunity in the FSIA, and the express provision[granting 
foreign states immunity in federal and state courts except 
as provided in the FSIA], preclude a construction of the 
Alien Tort Statute" that would permit a suit against a 
foreign nation. 488 U.S. at 438. 
 
We believe that Amerada Hess does not tilt the 
determination here in favor of the government's position. In 
reaching its holding, the Amerada Hess Court noted that its 
decision rested in part on the fact that the applicability of 
the Alien Tort Statute to suits against sovereign nations 
was uncertain from the outset. Id. at 436. Thus, the Court 
reasoned, "Congress's failure in the FSIA to enact an 
express pro tanto repealer of the Alien Tort Statute speaks 
only faintly, if at all, to the issue involved in this case. In 
light of the comprehensiveness of the statutory scheme in 
the FSIA, we doubt that even the most meticulous 
draftsman would have concluded that Congress also needed 
to amend pro tanto the Alien Tort Statute." Id. at 437. 
 
Furthermore, in Amerada Hess the Court pointedly noted 
that the Court of Appeals had not cited "any decision in 
which a United States court exercised jurisdiction over a 
foreign state under the Alien Tort Statute." Id. at 436. In 
other words, there was no long history of exercising 
jurisdiction that would have been disturbed by its decision. 
In this case, by contrast, there is no lack of clarity about 
the historic existence of habeas jurisdiction. 
 
Over a century's worth of precedent and practice 
unambiguously supports the conclusion that habeas 
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jurisdiction is available to aliens in executive custody. Chief 
Justice Marshall recognized the significance of the writ of 
habeas corpus in Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 
(1807). In reference to section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 
1789, the original predecessor of 28 U.S.C. S 2241, he 
stated: 
 
       [T]his act was passed by the first Congress of the 
       United States, sitting under a constitution which had 
       declared `that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
       should not be suspended, unless when, in cases of 
       rebellion or invasion, the public safety might require it.' 
 
        Acting under the immediate influence of this 
       injunction, they must have felt, with peculiar force, the 
       obligation of providing efficient means by which this 
       great constitutional privilege should receive life and 
       activity; for if the means be not in existence, the 
       privilege itself would be lost, although no law for its 
       suspension should be enacted. 
 
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 95. 
 
Despite repeated congressional efforts since the late 
nineteenth century to confer finality on the immigration 
decisions of the Attorney General, the Court has 
consistently recognized the availability of habeas relief to 
aliens facing deportation. See Majority op. at 12-17 supra. 
In light of this precedent, nothing less than an express 
statement of congressional intent is required before a grant 
of habeas corpus jurisdiction as provided in 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241 will be found to have been repealed. We will not 
presume that this grant of jurisdiction is removed by 
general language such as that used in the new INAS 242(g). 
Accordingly, we apply the rule of Felker and Yerger. 
Because this provision is no more specific with respect to 
jurisdiction under S 2241 than any of the others canvassed 
in this opinion, we discern no express repealer of the 
district courts' jurisdiction under S 2241. 
 
We note that this reading comports with our obligation to 
read statutes to avoid serious constitutional problems, such 
as those we would face were IIRIRA read to take away 
habeas jurisdiction as well as APA review. See Edward J. 
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades 
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Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); United States ex rel. 
Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 
408 (1909) (court should interpret statute to avoid"grave 
and doubtful constitutional questions"). 
 
The Suspension Clause of the United States Constitution 
states: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not 
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. Const. art. 
I, S 9, cl. 2. In Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977), the 
Court considered an amendment to the District of 
Columbia Code by which Congress divested the district 
courts of habeas jurisdiction and substituted a collateral 
proceeding in that District's Superior Court, patterned after 
28 U.S.C. S 2255. The Court held that the legislation did 
not violate the Suspension Clause because "the 
substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither 
inadequate nor ineffective to test the legality of a person's 
detention does not constitute a suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus." 430 U.S. at 381. A statute removing all 
review of executive detention, however, would not provide 
an adequate and effective collateral remedy. 
 
Recognizing that its interpretation might lead to just 
such a constitutional dilemma, the government contends 
that under the 1996 amendments there is jurisdiction in 
the courts of appeals to entertain claims of "substantial 
constitutional error" by aliens in Sandoval's position. This 
argument must fail because of the absence of any support, 
either in the statute or in the legislative history. The 
government's briefs cite no provision of AEDPA or IIRIRA 
that supports its reading and it conceded at oral argument 
that there is no specific provision granting us jurisdiction 
over substantial constitutional claims. Although the 
government's argument would have more force if there were 
a constitutional imperative to read the 1996 statutes in 
that manner, our conclusion that the statutes have left 
habeas jurisdiction intact in the district courts removes any 
such imperative. 
 
In sum, because neither AEDPA nor IIRIRA contains a 
clear statement that Congress sought to eliminate habeas 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2241, we conclude that 
S 2241 survives the 1996 amendments. 
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4. Scope of Review Under Habeas Jurisdiction 
 
The jurisdictional holdings of the courts in Richardson 
and LaGuerre relieved them of any consideration of the 
scope of review under habeas corpus. Because the courts in 
Goncalves, Henderson, Magana-Pizano , and Lee sustained 
habeas jurisdiction under S 2241, they reached that issue 
and held that S 2241 jurisdiction covered not only 
constitutional claims but also the aliens' statutory claim 
that the Attorney General had S 212(c) to apply to pending 
cases. 
 
Inasmuch as the language of the habeas corpus statute 
encompasses claims that one "is in custody in violation of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States," 
28 U.S.C. S 2241(c)(3), we agree that Sandoval's statutory 
claim is cognizable in a habeas corpus proceeding. 5 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized 
that aliens may press statutory claims in habeas 
proceedings, even during the period when, according to the 
Heikkila Court, 345 U.S. at 234-35, judicial review in the 
immigration context was reduced to the minimum required 
by the Constitution. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Accardi 
v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 265 (1954) ("The crucial 
question is whether the alleged conduct of the Attorney 
General deprived petitioner of any of the rights guaranteed 
him by the statute or by the regulations issued pursuant 
thereto."); Gegiow v. Uhl, 239 U.S. 3, 9 (1915) ("The courts 
are not forbidden by the statute to consider whether the 
reasons, when they are given, agree with the requirements 
of the act. The statute, by enumerating the conditions upon 
which the allowance to land may be denied, prohibits the 
denial in other cases. And when the record shows that a 
commissioner of immigration is exceeding his power, the 
alien may demand his release upon habeas corpus."). 
 
We therefore agree with the legal conclusion reached by 
the District Court here that it had jurisdiction, in a habeas 
proceeding, to consider the statutory claim raised by 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This does not mean that a district court reviewing a deportation claim 
in a habeas proceeding necessarily has the same jurisdiction that a 
court of appeals previously had under a Petition for Review, an issue we 
leave for future decision. 
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Sandoval. Accord Henderson, 157 F.3d at 122 (Statutory 
claims "affecting the substantial rights of aliens of the sort 
the courts have secularly enforced" are reviewable on 
habeas); Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 124-25 ("The pure 
statutory claims Goncalves makes here are well within 
precedent interpreting the core habeas protection provided 
by S 2241."); Lee, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 42 ("[P]recedent and 
reason fully persuade me that the Constitution 
contemplates that courts inquiring into the legitimacy of 
executive detention on habeas must be available to hear 
claims of statutory as well as constitutional wrong."). 
 
5. The Pending Petition for Review 
 
Also pending before us is Sandoval's Petition for Review 
from the Board of Immigration Appeals, No. 98-3214, which 
we consolidated with the government's appeal from the 
District Court's grant of relief to Sandoval under its habeas 
corpus jurisdiction. The government argues that we lack 
subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Sandoval's Petition 
for Review, and cites in support our recent decision in 
Morel, holding that AEDPA S 440(a) "removes from us 
jurisdiction to review a claim of legal error in deportation 
proceedings." 144 F.3d at 251. Sandoval recognizes that a 
decision by this court that the District Court had 
jurisdiction under habeas corpus to review his claim would 
obviate the need for us to consider his Petition for Review. 
In light of our conclusion that the District Court had such 
jurisdiction, and in light of our decision in Morel, we will 
dismiss the Petition for Review.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Because of our conclusion that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 2241 
covers statutory, as well as constitutional claims, we need not decide 
whether the claimed existence of jurisdiction in the courts of appeals to 
review substantial constitutional claims, but not statutory claims, would 
be an adequate alternative. 
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B. 
 
Applicability of the AEDPA Amendment to 
INA S 212(c) to Sandoval 
 
Having determined that the District Court properly 
exercised habeas jurisdiction, we turn to consider the 
government's argument that the District Court erred in 
holding that AEDPA S 440(d) does not apply to deprive 
Sandoval of the opportunity to seek discretionary relief 
under INA S 212(c). Prior to AEDPA, INA S 212(c) permitted 
deportable aliens, other than those who had committed 
specified crimes (such as aggravated felonies and crimes of 
moral turpitude), to apply to the Attorney General for a 
waiver of deportation. AEDPA S 440(d) added drug offenses 
to the list of deportable offenses that made aliens ineligible 
for discretionary relief.7 The provision precluding 
discretionary relief for those convicted of drug offenses was 
not in effect at the time Sandoval sought to petition under 
INA S 212(c). The IJ denied Sandoval on the ground that he 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. AEDPA S 440(d) amends 8 U.S.C. S 1182(c). As amended, the statute 
reads in full: 
 
       Aliens lawfully admitted for permanent residence who temporarily 
       proceeded abroad voluntarily and not under an order of deportation, 
       and who are returning to a lawful unrelinquished domicile of seven 
       consecutive years, may be admitted in the discretion of the 
Attorney 
       General without regard to the provisions of subsection (a) of this 
       section (other than paragraphs (3) and (9)(C)). Nothing contained 
in 
       this subsection shall limit the authority of the Attorney General 
to 
       exercise the discretion in him under section 1181(b) of this title. 
       This subsection shall not apply to an alien who is deportable by 
       reason of having committed any criminal offense covered in section 
       241(a)(2)(A)(iii), (B), (C), or (D), or any offense covered by 
section 
       241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for which both predicate offenses are covered by 
       section 241(a)(2)(A)(I). 
 
See AEDPA S 440(d). Section 1182(c) was repealed by IIRIRA with respect 
to cases in which the INS instituted removal proceedings on or after 
April 1, 1997. See IIRIRA S 309. Because the INA initiated removal 
proceedings against Sandoval before April 1, 1997, the repeal of 
S 1182(c) does not apply here. 
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did not possess the requisite seven years lawful residence. 
Sandoval appealed to the BIA. 
 
Before the BIA rendered its decision on Sandoval's 
appeal, the Attorney General issued her decision in Matter 
of Soriano, Interim Decision 3289 (A.G. Feb. 21, 1997), in 
which she ruled that AEDPA S 440(d) applies to pending 
cases. The BIA, relying on Soriano, dismissed Sandoval's 
appeal on the ground that AEDPA S 440(d) made him 
ineligible for discretionary relief. The District Court 
disagreed, after analyzing the retroactivity decisions in 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994); Lindh v. 
Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997); and United States v. 
Skandier, 125 F.3d 1788 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, the 
court entered an injunction staying Sandoval's deportation 
and ordered the INS to consider Sandoval's application for 
relief on its merits. 
 
The government urges that the District Court erred in 
finding that AEDPA S 440(d) does not apply to Sandoval. 
The government contends that the Attorney General's 
decision in Soriano is correct, and that her decision is 
entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
Sandoval argues that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Landgraf, understood in light of the intervening decision in 
Lindh, compels the conclusion that S 440(d) is not to be 
applied to cases pending on the date of enactment. 
 
As a threshold matter, we note that we are doubtful 
about the appropriateness of Chevron deference in this 
setting. Under Chevron, we are required, in the absence of 
a direct expression of congressional intent on an issue, to 
defer to an agency's reasonable interpretation of its 
governing statute. 467 U.S. at 843. But Chevron  appears to 
speak to statutory interpretation in those instances where 
Congress delegated rule-making power to an agency and 
thereby sought to rely on agency expertise in the 
formulation of substantive policy. See id. at 865. An issue 
concerning a statute's effective date is not one that 
implicates agency expertise in a meaningful way, and does 
not, therefore, appear to require Chevron deference. See 
Goncalves, 144 F.3d at 127. Rather, the question of a 
statute's effective date appears to present "a pure question 
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of statutory construction for the courts to decide." INS v. 
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 (1987). 
 
We need not decide, however, whether Chevron deference 
applies. Assuming arguendo that Chevron does apply, it 
directs us to ascertain, by "employing traditional tools of 
statutory construction," whether Congress has expressed 
"an intention on the precise question at issue." 467 U.S. at 
843 n.9. By following that direction, we conclude that 
AEDPA does contain an expression of congressional intent 
and that Congress's intent was that the AEDPA amendment 
to S 212(c) was not to be applied to pending cases. 
 
In Landgraf, the Court set forth the now-familiar 
principles for determining the temporal reach of a statute: 
 
       When a case implicates a federal statute enacted after 
       the events in suit, the court's first task is to determine 
       whether Congress has expressly prescribed the 
       statute's proper reach. If Congress has done so, of 
       course, there is no need to resort to judicial default 
       rules. When, however, the statute contains no such 
       express command, the court must determine whether 
       the new statute would have retroactive effect, i.e., 
       whether it would impair rights a party possessed when 
       he acted, increase a party's liability for past conduct, 
       or impose new duties with respect to transactions 
       already completed. If the statute would operate 
       retroactively, our traditional presumption teaches that 
       it does not govern absent clear congressional intent 
       favoring such a result. 
 
511 U.S. at 280. Thus, Landgraf contemplates a two-step 
inquiry: First, a determination, using the ordinary tools of 
statutory construction, whether Congress prescribed the 
temporal compass of the statute, and, if not, second, a 
determination whether application would have a 
"retroactive effect." 
 
The Court elaborated upon Landgraf in Lindh, where the 
Court was called upon to determine the temporal reach of 
another AEDPA provision--one that heightens the 
standards for granting S 2254 habeas relief in noncapital 
cases. The Lindh Court, speaking through Justice Souter, 
emphasized early in the opinion that "in determining a 
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statute's temporal reach generally, our normal rules of 
construction apply." 117 S.Ct. at 2063. It noted that 
AEDPA set up one set of rules for noncapital cases--for 
which Congress provided no effective date--and another for 
capital cases--for which Congress made express provision, 
i.e., the rules would apply to pending cases. Accordingly, 
the Court held that Congress had, by negative implication, 
expressed its intent that the rules pertaining to noncapital 
cases apply only prospectively, stating that "[n]othing, 
indeed, but a different intent explains the different 
treatment." Id. at 2064. In so holding, the Lindh Court 
made clear that the rule of negative implication is part of 
the normal rules of statutory construction. Lindh amplified 
the first step of the Landgraf analysis, making clear that if 
the statutory construction inquiry yields the answer that 
Congress intended prospectivity, the inquiry ends and the 
court need not engage in an analysis of whether there 
would be a "retroactive effect." Id.; see also Mathews v. 
Kidder Peabody, No. 97-3164 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting that 
Lindh "essentially add[s] a step" to the Landgraf inquiry). 
 
When the Attorney General considered the applicability of 
AEDPA S 440(d) to pending cases in Soriano , she found that 
it did not contain an express directive, and then proceeded 
to consider whether its application to pending cases would 
have an impermissibly retroactive effect. Applying this 
second step in the Landgraf analysis, she concluded that 
AEDPA S 440(d) would not have such an effect. In urging 
the correctness of this decision, the government relies, as 
did the Attorney General, on our decision in Scheidemann 
v. INS, 83 F.3d 1517 (3d Cir. 1996). However, both Soriano 
and Scheidemann were issued without the benefit of the 
Lindh court's elaboration of Landgraf principles. 
 
The issue in Scheidemann was whether a 1990 
amendment to INA S 212(c)--one that made"aggravated 
felonies" a disqualification for discretionary relief--was 
intended to encompass pre-enactment convictions. In 
examining the text of the relevant statutory provisions in 
their context, we concluded that the "design of the [statute] 
clearly demonstrated that Congress intended the 
temporally-unrestricted definition of `aggravated felony' to 
apply to pre-enactment convictions." Id. at 1524. We stated 
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that this interpretation was the only "sensible" one, and 
that a contrary interpretation would have rendered a 
congressional provision "absurd." Id. at 1526. 
 
That issue was different than the one before us now 
under a different statute. Even in Scheidemann , where we 
held the 1990 amendment applicable to pre-enactment 
conduct, we specified that such construction was applicable 
only to aliens who applied for discretionary relief after the 
effective date of the 1990 amendment. See id.  at 1526 & 
n.12. 
 
We thus apply the analysis instructed by Lindh , which 
was unavailable both in Scheidemann and in Soriano. 
Section 440(d) bears no effective date, although it does 
provide that pre-enactment offenses should be considered. 
However, several other comparable provisions do have 
express effective dates. For example, AEDPA S 413, entitled 
"Denial of Other Relief for Alien Terrorists," (like AEDPA 
S 440(a)) makes relief that was previously available at the 
agency's discretion unavailable to aliens fitting a particular 
description, that of an "alien terrorist." Significantly, S 413 
(unlike S 440(d)) includes a provision making it effective 
with respect to "applications filed before, on or after [the 
date of enactment] if final action has not been taken on 
them before such date." AEDPA S 413(g). This difference in 
treatment between "alien terrorists" underS 413 and aliens 
convicted of the referenced crimes under S 440(d) leads to 
the negative implication that Congress intended the AEDPA 
amendments to apply in pending cases with respect to the 
former group of aliens but not the latter. "[W]here Congress 
includes particular language in one section of a statute but 
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally 
presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 
the disparate inclusion or exclusion." Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 
U.S. at 432 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
The legislative history of the revision to S 212(c) lends 
firm support to this reading of the statute. See id. at 432 
(using legislative history to confirm textual reading of 
statute). The Senate version of the bill had within it 
language expressly making the amended INA S 212(c) 
applicable to pending cases, while the comparable section 
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of the House version did not. Compare S. 735, 104th Cong. 
S 303(f) (1995), with H.R. 2703, 104th Cong. S 662 (1996). 
The final bill that emerged from the conference committee 
dropped the language from the Senate bill that would have 
made the amendment to S 212(c) applicable in pending 
proceedings, but retained the language from the House bill 
that made the amendments with respect to alien terrorists 
applicable to pending cases. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-518, at 
119 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 944, 952; see 
also Gonclaves, 144 F.3d at 131-32 (exhaustively 
canvassing the legislative history). This legislative history 
confirms that Congress deliberately chose to make AEDPA 
S 440(d) apply prospectively. As the Court noted in Cardoza- 
Fonseca, "Few principles of statutory construction are more 
compelling than the proposition that Congress does not 
intend sub silentio to enact statutory language that it has 
earlier discarded in favor of other language." 480 U.S. at 
442-43 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
Thus, according to the Lindh Court's explication of 
Landgraf, we can discern by negative implication that 
AEDPA S 440(d) was not intended to apply to cases pending 
on the date of enactment. Commenting on a similar issue 
of statutory construction, the Supreme Court had 
previously directed that, "If a court, employing traditional 
tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress 
had an intention on the precise question at issue, that 
intention is the law and must be given effect." Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 843 n. 9. Because the Lindh court has made clear 
that the rule of negative implication is part of the normal 
rules of construction, the Chevron instruction is satisfied as 
well. 
 
In sum, we conclude that Congress did indeed express an 
intent that AEDPA's amendment to INA S 212(c) should not 
apply to cases pending on the date of enactment, and so 
hold. Accord Henderson, 157 F.3d at 129-30; Goncalves, 
144 F.3d at 128-31. Therefore, we need not reach the 
question whether AEDPA S 440(d) violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. Consequently, we conclude that the 
District Court did not err in directing the agency to decide 
the merits of Sandoval's claim for discretionary relief. 
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IV. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, in Nos. 98-1099 and 98-1547 
we will affirm the decision of the District Court and in No. 
98-3214 we will dismiss the Petition for Review. 
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ALITO, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
 
I agree with LaGuerre v. Reno, 1998 WL 912107, at 1-2 
(7th Cir. 1998), that Congress has eliminated the district 
courts' jurisdiction to entertain habeas petitions such as 
the one at issue here. Before the enactment of the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, Section 
106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 
U.S.C. S 1105a (a), provided that a petition for review filed 
in a court of appeals was, with a few specified exceptions, 
"the sole and exclusive procedure for . . . the judicial review 
of all final orders of deportation." One of the specified 
exceptions provided that "any alien held in custody 
pursuant to an order of deportation [could] obtain judicial 
review thereof by habeas corpus proceedings." Section 106 
(a)(10) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. S 1105a(a)(10). 
 
AEDPA changed this scheme. Section 401(e) of AEDPA, 
entitled "ELIMINATION OF CUSTODY REVIEW BY HABEAS 
CORPUS," struck former subsection (10). Section 440(a) of 
AEDPA substituted the following language for the former 
text of that subsection: 
 
       Any final order of deportation against an alien who is 
       deportable by reason of having committed a criminal 
       offense covered in section 241(a)(2) (A)(iii), (B), (C), or 
       (D), or any offense covered by section 241(a)(2)(A)(ii) for 
       which both predicate offenses are covered by section 
       241(a)(2)(A)(i), shall not be subject to review by any 
       court. 
 
In my view, the text of Section 106(a) as amended by 
AEDPA precluded the type of habeas proceeding that is now 
before us. After AEDPA, the introductory portion of Section 
106(a) still provided that a petition for review by a court of 
appeals was "the sole and exclusive procedure for. . . the 
judicial review of all final orders of deportation"; the 
exception previously set out in subsection (10), which 
permitted an alien held in custody pursuant to an order of 
deportation to obtain "judicial review" of that order by 
means of a habeas corpus proceeding, had been pointedly 
repealed in a statutory section labeled "ELIMINATION OF 
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CUSTODY REVIEW BY HABEAS CORPUS"; and in the place 
of this previous exception, there was inserted language 
stating that such deportation orders "shall not be subject to 
review by any court." These provisions are clear-- they 
eliminated habeas jurisdiction -- and it is therefore 
unnecessary to consider the effect of related provisions of 
the subsequently enacted Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
110 Stat. 3009 (1996), for whatever effect these provisions 
had, they most certainly did not restore the district courts' 
jurisdiction to entertain the type of habeas petition that is 
at issue. 
 
In concluding that AEDPA did not touch the district 
courts' habeas jurisdiction, the majority invokes the 
principle that repeals of habeas jurisdiction should not be 
presumed. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 658-60 
(1996). The majority then reasons that the amendment of 
Section 106(a)(10) did not affect the district courts' habeas 
jurisdiction under a separate statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. 
S 2241. This interpretation, however, presents numerous 
problems. First, it ignores the plain meaning of INA Section 
106(a), which, after AEDPA, stated that -- with a few, 
specified and non-pertinent exceptions -- a petition for 
review by a court of appeals was "the sole and exclusive 
procedure for . . . judicial review of all final orders of 
deportation." Second, the majority's interpretation ignores 
the heading of Section 401(e) of AEDPA, viz., "ELIMINATION 
OF CUSTODY REVIEW BY HABEAS CORPUS." Third, the 
majority's interpretation ignores the clear meaning of the 
new text that was placed in Section 106(a)(10), which 
stated unequivocally that final orders of deportation such 
as the one at issue here "shall not be subject to review by 
any court." Fourth, the majority's interpretation has the 
perverse effect of lengthening the process of judicial review 
of deportation orders based on the commission of a 
criminal offense. 
 
The majority's analysis is not supported by Felker, which 
concerned the meaning of 28 U.S.C. S 2244(b)(3)(E). This 
provision, which states that a court of appeals order 
granting or denying authorization to file a second or 
successive habeas application is not subject to review by 
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means of a petition for rehearing or certiorari, does not 
state that the Supreme Court cannot review such an order 
in an original habeas proceeding, and the Court refused to 
conclude that S 2241(b)(3)(E) implicitly effected that result. 
Here, by contrast, Section 106(a) of the INA, as amended by 
AEDPA, expressly precluded a district court from exercising 
habeas jurisdiction under the circumstances present here. 
Accordingly, in No. 98-1099, I would reverse the judgment 
of the District Court and remand with instructions to 
dismiss. This result does not implicate the Suspension 
Clause because any judicial review to which Sandoval is 
constitutionally entitled can and should be provided by 
means of a petition for review filed in our court. 
 
Such a petition is before us in No. 98-3214. However, in 
Morel v. INS, 144 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 1998), another panel of 
our court, while recognizing that an alien subject to an 
order of deportation is entitled to "Article III review of 
claims of `substantial Constitutional error,' " held that such 
an alien is not constitutionally entitled to review of a non- 
constitutional claim. Id. at 251. If Morel too narrowly 
construed the scope of the review to which a petitioner like 
Sandoval is constitutionally entitled, Morel should be 
overruled. The problem should not be compounded by 
authorizing the district courts to exercise a type of habeas 
jurisdiction that Congress curtailed. For present purposes, 
however, since Morel is binding on this panel, I agree with 
the majority that we must dismiss the petition insofar as it 
asserts non-constitutional claims. I add that, if we were free 
to reach the merits, I would follow the Seventh Circuit's 
analysis in LaGuerre. I would also deny the petition insofar 
as it asserts an equal protection claim. See LaGuerre, 1998 
WL 912107 at 4-5. 
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